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Compulsory Audit of Corporations*
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, 
Kansas City, Missouri, October 19, 1932.
By Frederick B. Andrews
After the full fury of the great war had struck, and the peoples 
of the world found themselves enmeshed in a struggle whose 
origins they did not understand, there arose the determination 
that out of that war should come an end of war. Among the 
various methods proposed to that end, perhaps none was more 
cogently expressed than the demand that agreements between 
nations should be “open covenants, openly arrived at.” Al­
though subject to manifest limitations, the idea had a force which 
excused even a schoolmaster president for using “ a preposition to 
end a sentence with.” It has never been completely ignored 
since then; it will never be completely ignored hereafter.
No better understood than the ultimate causes of the world 
war have been those of the world-wide business depression of the 
past three years. But even an uncomprehending world realizes 
that those supposed safeguards on which it had been taught to 
rely have not sufficed to protect multitudes of innocent investors 
from heavy losses. From the confusing minutiae of individual 
complaints, one of the few common cries has been, “ If I had only 
known.” To be sure, this might have meant merely a change 
in the life-boat personnel; but even after making full allowance 
for those who will go to sea in any craft, it seems reasonable that 
an accurate knowledge of the vessel’s condition would have pre­
vented her sailing, or at least would have brought her into an 
emergency port, crippled perhaps but still afloat and with her 
passenger list intact. Before dropping this metaphor I should, 
perhaps, apologize to that majestic maritime tradition which 
requires the captain to go down with his ship unless the safety of 
all others is assured; such a tradition in finance would go far 
toward reducing the risk of non-managing investors.
Similar to that demand for open covenants openly arrived at is 
the demand for compulsory audit of corporations. This demand 
should be considered carefully by three large groups—by manage­
ment, because it is aimed directly at sins of management; by 
stockholders and creditors, because it promises them protection 
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and they must meet its cost; by professional accountants, because 
its implications lay on their shoulders a tremendous burden of 
responsibility, and because it involves for them a huge amount 
of work.
Not all, by any means, of the ills revealed by the current de­
pression may be charged to the absence of audit, and it would be 
unwise to lead investors into the belief that an audit will com­
pletely safeguard their investments. Hatry under the English 
compulsory audit system, Insull under the American voluntary 
audit system, Kreuger under no audit system, hundreds of banks 
under the scrutiny of federal or state examiners—how do they 
differ in the eyes of ruined investors and depositors? All failures, 
and present in each case a curtain of secrecy successfully veiling, 
regardless of audit, the scandalous misuse of funds which made 
collapse inevitable when the strain should come. Remove that cur­
tain, remove with it the myth of the super-man, and give the power­
ful restraining force of public opinion a chance to operate. This 
is the essence of the demand for compulsory audit of corpora­
tions.
Corporations conduct practically all business of consequence in 
this country, and the corporate form of organization not only 
permits but in large enterprises necessitates the complete separa­
tion of ownership from management. The demand for com­
pulsory audit, then, seems to mean that wherever in a business 
enterprise ownership and management are divorced, management 
must submit to independent scrutiny, with the results of that 
scrutiny reported directly and intelligibly to ownership. If this 
interpretation is correct, then the term corporation must, for the 
purposes of this discussion, be both enlarged and abridged. It 
must be enlarged so as to include all publicly-financed enterprises 
even though unincorporated; and it must be abridged so as to 
exclude incorporated enterprises where ownership and manage­
ment rest in the same persons. Further, the term ownership 
must be understood to include not only stockholders but also 
bondholders and other substantial creditors.
There are four large groups of corporations already subject to 
intensive scrutiny by federal or state authorities, namely, rail­
roads, insurance companies, public utilities and banking and 
building and loan institutions. Shall there be compulsory audits 
of these corporations, specifically for the information and pro­
tection of their security-holders?
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I believe that railroads do not generally employ independent 
auditors for the purpose which we have in mind. A considerable 
part of the vast array of statistics required of them by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission is published, and since these are 
largely verified by auditors for the commission it may be said that 
we already have for the railroads what is sought under the name 
of compulsory audit of corporations.
Insurance and public-utility companies in increasing numbers 
are publishing statements certified by independent auditors; but 
these auditors are appointed and paid by management, and in 
some cases, particularly with reference to large utility holding 
companies, their statements have not even remotely resembled an 
intelligible exposition of corporate affairs. Even before the 
Insull crash became first a probability and then an actuality, 
there were not wanting voices crying in the wilderness, demanding 
“more light and power too” and urging utility magnates to 
repent and to prepare the way of the Lord. Now the silver 
cord is loosed, and the golden bowl has been broken; small 
wonder, then, that John Baptist, who today retains his head 
regardless of how it cerebrates, is sometimes heard to say, “I 
told you so.”
Probably no group of corporations has done more to bring about 
audit of others, or would more strenuously resist compulsory audit 
of their own accounts, than banking corporations. Probably also 
no group is more justified than well-managed banking corporations 
in the contention that an audit of their accounts is unnecessary. 
However, since no one is required to prove himself a banker in 
order to engage in banking (or, at least, in some activity under 
that name) the number of well-managed banking corporations is 
not so great a proportion of the total number as could be desired. 
Amazing embezzlements by bank employes, and criminal prosecu­
tions of “banksters” on charges of conspiracy to defraud their 
depositors, give a sickly color to that scrutiny of banking corpora­
tions already imposed by law. This pallor is like that of grass 
growing beneath a board, and simple heliotherapy is the indicated 
treatment.
Excepting possibly the railroads, then, I see no reason for ex­
cluding from the compulsion for audit any of these groups of 
already-publicly-regulated corporations.
It is no news that every one that doeth evil hateth the light, 
lest his deeds should be reproved, but he that doeth truth cometh 
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to the light. It will be said that this light will inform com­
petitors, to the detriment of management and to the ultimate 
injury of ownership. This argument was urged against the 
income-tax amendment, but after twenty years it is heard only 
from the lips of those citizens whom the income-tax laws have 
compelled to suspend, temporarily at least, their business activi­
ties. I have had occasion to observe a night watchman in the 
vicinity of my home, throwing a beam of light from an electric 
torch into the shadows under shrubbery and in the corners of 
garages. Considering his physique, I have suspected that if 
confronted by a semi-senior, or even a junior, footpad this pro­
tector of the peace would have to call a cop. Nevertheless, there 
is a protection there—that beam of light is more to be feared by 
the wrong-doer than is the man who wields it. Let us have light 
—at least enough light so that ownership may know what is 
being done with its property. If certain operations can not stand 
publicity, how can we be so certain that they are truly for the best 
interests of ownership? Officers of banks and holding companies 
who know that the details of their portfolios will be published, 
corporate executives who know that their stockholders will be 
fully informed of their acts, will be powerfully moved to establish 
supportable policies the soundness of which will be revealed by 
audit. Thus the entire body of ownership, not merely those 
persons who are astute enough to read between the lines of obscure 
or equivocastatements, will be benefited.
I submit that the most damaging feature of the current depres­
sion has not been the financial loss which it has brought to millions 
of our citizens. A nationwide drought or similar catastrophe of 
nature or an armed invasion from beyond our shores might have 
entailed even greater financial losses and done less damage. The 
worst damage has been that inflicted on our business morale by 
the wholesale betrayal of the confidence of investors. That 
confidence must be restored. There must be assurance that 
management of all publicly-financed enterprises will function in 
the light of publicity—pitiless publicity if necessary.
Each of us has at some time declaimed with sophomoric fervor 
the gentle answer made by Portia to Shylock’s arrogant demand, 
“By what compulsion must I? Tell me that.” But moral 
suasion failed Portia, and she had to find a compulsion which 
served. When moral suasion fails the management-employed 
auditor, he must do likewise. By what compulsion, then, can an
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arrogant management be forced to submit to effective audit— 
that is, an audit not only effective in itself but also given effective 
publicity?
The corporation is a creature of the state, from which it derives 
its existence and all of its powers, privileges and immunities. 
The unquestionable preponderance of honesty on the part of 
corporate management and the tremendous value of the corporate 
form of organization require that some means be devised for 
curbing abuses of corporate powers. If compulsory audit is the 
remedy for those abuses, the state is amply justified in applying 
it to all corporations alike. This has been done in at least three 
jurisdictions.
In England every corporation is required to furnish to its stock­
holders two weeks before their annual meeting a current balance- 
sheet, accompanied by an auditor’s certificate that it does or that 
it does not exhibit a correct view of the company’s affairs. No 
form for this balance-sheet is prescribed; it is not even prepared 
by the auditor—the company submits the balance-sheet and the 
auditor merely tells what he thinks of it. The auditor is not per­
mitted to be a director, officer or employe of the company. His 
qualifications are not specified, but he is almost invariably a 
chartered accountant. He is appointed in the first instance by 
the directors, and thereafter elected by the stockholders annually. 
None but the retiring auditor may be so elected except after notice 
of intention to nominate another, with the result that the auditor 
originally appointed by the directors (generally on recommenda­
tion of the officers) is most apt to be continued in office unless he 
makes himself emphatically objectionable to the stockholders. 
He has the right of access to whatever records he considers perti­
nent, and he must give an unequivocal certificate. He has the 
right to attend any general meeting at which the accounts are to 
be considered and there to make such statements or explanations 
about the accounts as he may desire. This includes, of course, the 
meeting at which the auditor for the ensuing year is to be elected.
In Germany every corporation is required to furnish to its 
stockholders, at or before their annual meeting, a current balance- 
sheet and statement of income, the form of which is prescribed in 
considerable detail. These statements must be accompanied by 
an auditor’s certificate to the effect, not only that the statements 
themselves are correctly prepared and in agreement with the 
books, but that all statutory requirements relative to corporation 
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accounts have been observed. The auditor is not permitted to 
be a director, officer or employe of the company nor in any way 
under obligation to it, and he must be a person qualified in ac­
counting. He is elected by the stockholders, although actually 
engaged by the officers. If the directors, the officers, or the hold­
ers of so much as ten per cent of the stock object to the auditor so 
elected, the matter is referred to local courts for final selection. 
In addition to certifying the published statements, the auditor is 
required to render a written report on the audit and the directors 
are required to take cognizance of such report and to inform the 
stockholders of any important exceptions noted by the auditor. 
The auditor is liable in damages to the company for the divulging 
of trade secrets and also in damages of not more than 100,000 
marks for negligence; that term, however, is not defined. The 
auditor is subject to punishment by both imprisonment and fine 
for making a false representation in his report or for concealing 
important facts.
Coming to this country, we find that in Massachusetts every 
corporation is required to file annually with the commissioner of 
corporations a statement of condition which includes a balance- 
sheet conforming substantially to a form prescribed by statute. 
In the case of a corporation having a capital stock of $100,000 
or more, or 1,000 or more shares of no-par-value stock, this 
balance-sheet must be accompanied by an auditor’s affidavit that 
it represents the true condition of the affairs of said corporation as 
disclosed by its books. The auditor is not permitted to be an 
officer of the corporation. His qualifications are not specified but 
he is generally a certified public accountant. He is appointed by 
a committee of three selected by the stockholders from their own 
number, and no director may be a member of this committee. 
He is sworn to the faithful performance of his duties but these are 
not prescribed and are presumably determined by his own judg­
ment. While the statement of condition and all accompanying 
statements filed with the commissioner become public documents, 
there is no statutory requirement that copies be furnished direct 
to stockholders nor any provision that the auditor, in his official 
capacity as such, may attend stockholders’ meetings to explain or 
comment on the accounts.
Although satisfactory statutory compulsion in the United 
States may be difficult to secure, because of the many separate 
sovereignties, the ineptness of legislators when dealing with so
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highly technical a subject and the very large number of corpora­
tions as to which there is no apparent public need for auditing, 
still it is not impossible.
As to this third difficulty, the so-called close corporation, I 
suggest a provision permitting the waiver of audit on written 
consent of the holders of all or substantially all of the capital 
stock entitled to vote at the annual meeting. Proxy action on 
this subject should be barred. Creditors or holders of non-voting 
stock having an interest equal to, say, ten per cent or more of the 
par or stated value of the voting stock should be given power to 
veto this waiver by appropriate application to the regulating 
authorities.
The first of the dangers apt to arise from the ineptness of legis­
lators is in fixing the qualifications of the auditor. In New York, 
for instance, a bill was introduced last year which, if it had been 
passed, would have required enterprises of a certain character to 
be audited by certified public accountants. Since New York does 
not permit the holders of this title from other states to apply it to 
themselves in New York, a specification so apparently praise­
worthy would in fact bar from the proposed work many persons 
peculiarly fitted to perform it. Thus in states where accountants 
are not at present subject to statutory regulation or licensing, 
such a provision would amount to exactly that, and such regulation 
should be approached and considered under its own name. Cer­
tainly no barrier should be erected at any state line or else­
where which might prevent a competent person from serving as 
corporation auditor. Of this sort of thing we have too much 
already.
The second danger would show itself when the legislators under­
took to prescribe an audit procedure or the form in which the 
resulting statements should be set up and their accompanying 
certificates phrased. If any such provision is to be included in 
the statute, the advice and assistance of accountants in its drafting 
will be indispensable, and the good intentions of legislators who 
regard such drafting as their job must not be allowed to vitiate 
the whole measure, as good intentions so frequently do.
At least substantial uniformity among the various states is 
imperative if confusion is not to be worse confounded. The scan­
dalous seductiveness by which a few of our states already lure 
corporations away from their natural homes, to the enrichment of 
those states and with possibilities of danger to investors every­
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where, must not be enhanced. Any state imposing compulsory 
audit on its own corporations should also amend its “blue sky” 
law to forbid the distribution within its borders of securities of 
foreign corporations not subject to equally strict audit. This 
would be necessary as a protection for the securities of its own 
companies.
This uniformity is not impossible of attainment. The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has, during 
the past forty years, recommended for adoption by the states a 
total of fifty laws, of which two have been enacted by all the 
states and at least sixteen by one-third or more; only four have 
failed of adoption somewhere, and these were all recommended 
within the past six years. This conference, composed of com­
missioners appointed by the various governors and by the presi­
dent, accepts the cooperation of committees on uniform state 
laws from the American and the various state bar associations. 
Surely a uniform compulsory-audit-of-corporations act would 
surpass many of the fifty and might be held to equal the uniform 
bills-of-lading, warehouse receipts and negotiable-instruments 
acts. The same machinery which put those acts on the statute 
books of so many states is still available, and I submit that the 
American Institute of Accountants would be doing a real public 
service by engaging the attention of the American Bar Associa­
tion for this reform and by appointing a committee to work on 
this subject with the association’s committee on uniform state 
laws. I believe the association’s attitude would be found 
friendly, and while the necessary thoroughness of the work would 
perhaps chafe the impatient, still the likelihood of the effective­
ness would be greater than could be hoped for from independent 
and non-correlated action in the separate states.
Some advantages are claimed for the proposal to have this 
compulsion imposed, not by the state as a price for corporate 
existence, but by the various stock exchanges as a price for the 
privilege of listing, as is already done to a limited extent. Such a 
requirement would reach the great majority of publicly-financed 
enterprises, and at the same time avoid a sudden and perhaps 
insupportable accession of work for the accounting profession. 
Its framers might reasonably be presumed to have a greater 
knowledge of what is needed and to be to a much greater degree 
than any group of legislators free from political influences. Uni­
formity might be achieved among the various exchanges much 
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more easily than among the various state legislatures, and readily 
available co-operation with accountants’ organizations would 
facilitate the maintenance of proper standards of disclosure in the 
auditors’ reports.
It may well be asked, however, whether the stock exchanges 
have not already waited too long to adopt this reform. Their 
objective being a free market, they have ever done reverence to 
the doctrine of caveat emptor. The essence of the demand for 
compulsory audit of corporations is caveat vendor, a doctrine 
which has grown in favor tremendously since the days of Dr. 
Wiley’s heroic fight for the pure-food-and-drugs act. Rightly or 
wrongly, the exchanges, being composed of brokers directly bene­
fited by a large volume of trading irrespective of the relation be­
tween market and actual values, are generally viewed as having 
been parties to the lamb-shearings of all decades. Compulsion 
adopted by them for the audit of companies listing securities on 
their boards, if insuring adequate publicity for the results ob­
tained, would be very effective, but it would neither satisfy nor 
silence the demand we have noted.
We are left, then, with the question, what kind of audit? A 
double-barreled question, going alike to the character of the 
investigation and the character of the resulting report. It is 
important that, as to the first “barrel,” no legislature should 
undertake the answer without the advice and assistance of the 
accounting profession. The result of such an effort, at its best, 
might be capable of being followed in actual audit practice, but 
it would almost inevitably permit of literal observance attended 
by complete lack of the desired results. It is impossible for the 
average legislature to arrive at a wise solution of questions that 
involve a knowledge of highly technical principles. Only an ex­
perienced auditor knows what must be done, and—more impor­
tant still—what may safely be left undone, in attempting to 
discover from accounts and other records the true financial posi­
tion of a corporation large enough to command a real public 
interest.
The brochure published by the Federal Reserve Board in 1929 
under the title Verification of Financial Statements was the 
fruit of years of hard work by a committee of this Institute 
comprising some of the best brains of the profession; and it 
is a work of which they, and we vicariously, may well be 
proud. It sets up a standard which certainly must be met
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in any audit, for the purpose indicated, worthy of the name. 
Every member of the profession is charged with knowledge 
of it and, although he may accomplish his purpose by some 
other adequate method, he is without justification if by ignor­
ing the procedure there outlined he fails to discover any serious 
error which would have been discovered by following this stand­
ard procedure.
This booklet, then, affords an excellent basis for whatever 
statutory provision may be worked out to specify audit procedure. 
The work of adapting it to that purpose should be done very care­
fully by the agencies I have indicated as best qualified to draft 
such a statute.
I submit that one of the most serious, if not the most serious, 
of the questions confronting our profession today is the character 
of the financial statements given to ownership over the auditor’s 
signature. Shall we remember that truth lies as much in the 
ear of the hearer as in the mouth of the speaker, and certify only 
such statements as we consider not merely technically accurate 
but also reasonably safe against being misunderstood? Or shall 
we adhere to the doctrine of caveat emptor and consider our full 
duty done when our statements are so drawn that criticism may 
be answered by pointing to some obscure words of qualification? 
The time to determine this is not when we are confronted with 
a difficult decision, when we are urged by a trusted management 
to minimize untoward appearances, and when the voice of owner­
ship can not reach our ear.
Whom do we serve? Not alone management, to the possible 
concealment of its failures, its indiscretions, or worse; not alone 
a dissatisfied portion of ownership seeking an excuse for embar­
rassing an honest management. We must serve, or forfeit our 
right to serve at all, the whole structure, ownership and manage­
ment alike. The lens does not concern itself with the kind of 
light rays presenting themselves for passage; it takes such as 
come, brings them into proper focus, and presents a true image. 
Such is the function of the auditor.
I am proud to be a member of a profession embracing so many 
practitioners as does American accountancy who have, when nec­
essary, unhesitatingly accepted the unhappy role of Policeman 
Day, calling their erring clients back from the City of Night, and 
have insisted on full disclosure of all pertinent facts to those 
entitled to knowledge. In countless instances, with no applaud-
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ing audience, they have done this even to the point of alienating 
clients who represent their livelihood, knowing full well that 
others are standing by ready and willing to extend the accommo­
dation they refuse.
This makes the problem sound very simple. Brand the shys­
ters for what they are, and let the world look to us, the lily whites, 
the very elect, for the real, the genuine, full disclosure. Not for 
us the misstatement or omission of essential fact. This is a 
monster we abhor, which to be hated needs but to be seen. But 
pause a moment—there need be no misstatement, no omission; 
management deftly shades the light a bit, perhaps suggests a 
footnote (set in small type, true enough, and difficult to read) 
which may be made an inseparable part of the statement which 
is certainly there for any reader to see; and we may come to view 
ourselves not as concealing or misstating, but as serving the esti­
mable purpose of avoiding dissension and making smooth the 
path of the footsore. There remains full disclosure, but in that 
subdued and seductive light which does so much to soothe and so 
little to disturb. And seen too oft, familiar with her face . . .
Let me be specific.
Recently a certain company issued to its stockholders a report 
containing a balance-sheet, an income account and an analysis of 
surplus, all duly certified. On the assets side of the balance-sheet, 
7% of the total represented current assets; 81% represented 
securities of other companies, some wholly owned and some of the 
others owned to the extent at least of voting control; and 12% 
represented obligations of certain of these controlled companies. 
On the liabilities side, 1% represented current liabilities, 1% re­
serves, 31% capital stock, 58% capital surplus and 9% earned 
surplus. Not even all of this information appeared on the face of 
the balance-sheet, for the extent of ownership represented by the 
securities mentioned was ascertainable only from an incomplete 
list three pages removed from the balance-sheet.
The balance-sheet itself was set in clear bold type, but beneath 
it were some lengthy footnotes set in very small type, readable 
only with difficulty, and understandable only by dint of real 
concentration. From these footnotes it could be ascertained that 
the market value of the securities mentioned was equal to only 
21% of the value at which they were included among the assets— 
in other words, that of the total asset values listed on the balance- 
sheet, 64% was in fact non-existent. There was no consolidated 
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balance-sheet, nor any balance-sheet of a wholly owned or a con­
trolled subsidiary.
It was also only from these footnotes, and that by a long arith­
metical calculation, that the single capital stock figure could be 
analyzed to show its application separately to the two classes of 
preferred stock and the common. This done, it appeared that the 
common-stock equity, against which of course there would be 
chargeable the asset-value shrinkage of 64%, was only 70% of 
the total.
Nowhere was there any information as to the origin of the 
capital surplus. From outside sources I was able to ascertain 
that at least three-fourths of this capital surplus represented the 
excess of the amount received for common stock over the amount 
of the par value of that stock at the date of this balance-sheet; 
about half of this excess represented a transfer to capital surplus 
resulting from a reduction of the par value of the outstanding 
common stock. Now the 64% shrinkage I have mentioned was 
much more than sufficient to wipe out all of the earned surplus 
plus one-fourth of the capital surplus, so that in fact the com­
pany’s paid-in capital was impaired at the date of the balance- 
sheet. I have no doubt that all this is perfectly legal; but I 
submit that investors are entitled to clear information on these 
facts somewhat in advance of such investigations as are now being 
made of the Insull companies by federal and state authorities.
The income account showed a net income, after providing for 
preferred stock dividends, equal to 36% on the par value of the 
common stock. But from another small-type footnote it ap­
peared that during the year losses on securities sold had been 
charged against capital surplus in amounts equal to 34% of the 
common stock par value, and that this same capital surplus had 
been charged further with about 165% of the common stock par 
value in order to effect a necessary write-down of the book value 
of securities of companies in which the reporting company did 
not have voting control.
Thus the common stockholders are told in stentorian tones that 
their stock is earning a handsome rate of income and that their 
asset equity amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars, after 
which it is whispered to those close enough to hear that this equity 
has shrunk to less than one-tenth of that sum and that the earn­
ings have been wiped out by losses. O, Full Disclosure, what 
crimes are committed in thy name!
362
Compulsory Audit of Corporations
Turning the page we come to the auditors’ certificate, which 
states that in their opinion the accompanying balance-sheet, 
statement of income and analysis of surplus correctly set forth, 
respectively, the financial condition of the company, the results of 
operations for the year and the changes in surplus for a small part 
of the year. So might a physician submit to a patient a drop of 
blood, saying that it correctly reflects certain phases of the 
patient’s physical condition; for truly it does, but only to the 
trained expert aided by a microscope.
What was this common stock worth at the date of this balance- 
sheet? Its book value was 1,590% of par, and its liquidating 
value 160%. Its net income, presumably consisting chiefly of 
dividends on stocks owned or service charges against controlled 
companies, and therefore highly uncertain of continuance, was 
36% of par, before considering the losses (equal to nearly 200% 
of par) charged to capital surplus for reasons not stated. Leaving 
my question unanswered—for, of course, there can be no precise 
answer—let me tell what happened to the market prices. During 
the week preceding the publication of this balance-sheet about 
1½% of the outstanding common stock of this company changed 
hands at an average price of approximately 180% of par; during 
the next five weeks, more than 40% was sold at prices running up 
to 960% of par, or six times its liquidating value and more than 
twenty-six times its indicated earning power. And this was not in 
1928, or in 1929—it was in the third year of the Great Depression.
During many years now it has been my privilege and my 
pleasure to have a personal acquaintance with some, at least, of 
the partners of the firm whose name was signed to the certificate I 
have mentioned. I should resent and resist with all the vehe­
mence at my command any insinuation against their ability or 
their integrity. I surmise that in order to secure the publication 
of the footnotes, from which I found it possible to calculate the 
company’s situation as being radically different from that indi­
cated by the statements standing alone, they had to stand up in 
vigorous opposition to the management. I am convinced that 
such disclosure as they made represents the utmost to which they 
could win over the management. Nevertheless, it is by no means 
impossible that during the five-week period when trading in this 
common stock became a spectacular feature of the exchange where 
it was listed, many persons relying on these balance-sheet figures 
and this audit certificate, but incapable of understanding the full
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import of the footnotes, bought the stock at prices aggregating 
many millions of dollars in excess of what the company’s officers 
and the company’s auditors knew it to be worth at the date of the 
balance-sheet. If this should prove to be the fact, we ought to 
view with genuine alarm the defense that these financial state­
ments, because of the qualifying footnotes, really gave that full 
disclosure of facts to which we all so eagerly render lip service.
Why should it be so difficult for the honest and capable auditor 
to perform what is not only his duty but his desire and make a 
genuinely adequate disclosure in his certified statements? What 
would have happened if the auditors in this case had firmly in­
sisted that the figures in the statements themselves should be 
adjusted to show the facts, which instead were recited in narrative 
form in the footnotes? My guess is simply this: Their status 
would have changed from auditors to ex-auditors, and the world 
would never have known why. Furthermore, in all probability, 
the world would never have learned about this company’s condi­
tion even so little as was here presented in footnote form.
It is in this last statement that there lies whatever of justifica­
tion the auditor may have. For myself it is not enough, because 
I believe that the readers of the report in ninety-nine cases out of 
a hundred do not study those footnotes—in fact, they probably 
do not understand even the statements any too well; but they do 
know and respect the auditors’ reputation, and reading the un­
qualified certificate they assume that all is well with the company. 
I can not deny, however, that there is merit in the proposition 
that half a loaf is better than none, and that the footnotes will 
enlighten at least some of the readers, who may do some preaching 
on their own account. Parenthetically, they may on the other 
hand sell the stock short at six times its liquidating value to some 
of their less-well-trained brethren. Human nature sometimes 
works that way—and, again, caveat emptor.
The signs of the times are that this condition must change. 
Millions of disillusioned and impoverished investors are resolved 
that they shall not again be bilked as they have been, and that the 
Kreugers and Insulls of the future shall not have their funds 
without submitting to real scrutiny and to real—that is, effective 
—publicity. Financial writers in the metropolitan newspapers 
are joining in the demand that auditors be no longer hired and 
fired by management and therefore subject to its orders as to what 
their reports shall or shall not contain, but that instead the audi-
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tors shall be elected by and be responsible only to the stock­
holders.
Of course, this is only a manner of speaking. The stockholders, 
as a body, are no more capable of selecting the auditors than they 
are of managing the enterprise. Our English friends found that 
out in their earlier practices. An auditor who offended the 
management was replaced at the next meeting of the stock­
holders, on the management’s ex-parte complaint that his reten­
tion would not be for the good of the company. To remedy this 
the English law was amended in two particulars: first, so that none 
but the retiring auditor could be elected except after notice given 
to the stockholders a week in advance of the meeting, and, second, 
so that the auditor might appear at any stockholders’ meeting 
to explain his report or to answer any questions which might be 
put to him by the stockholders.
As to the first of these two provisions—namely, that none but 
the retiring auditor may be elected—it seems to me that the 
required time for notice should be no less than that required for 
the general meeting of stockholders, in order to forestall the 
issuance of proxies to representatives of management in ignorance 
of the fact that so important a question is to be settled by vote. 
Bearing in mind that the auditor is at first appointed as a matter 
of law by the directors and as a matter of fact by the executive 
officers, the provision seems to set up a barrier against the very 
thing it tries to serve—namely, the free voice of the stockholders. 
It tends to perpetuate the engagement of the auditor first chosen, 
and, since his first appointment hinges on his acquaintance with 
the management, the provision if adopted in this country might 
lend unfortunate color to the charge of monopolistic tendencies in 
our profession. Its advantage to the auditor is that it protects 
him against a surplus attack and gives him an opportunity to 
prepare a defense against any movement to dislodge him. It 
seems to me that it would be well if the auditor were under the 
necessity for being always so prepared.
As to the second provision—namely, that permitting the audi­
tor to appear at stockholders’ meetings—I should go further and 
make it mandatory for the auditor to appear at the annual meet­
ings of both stockholders and directors, to address these meetings 
on the subject of the accounts and to answer questions. On the 
permissive basis, his appearance would be unusual, and therefore 
management would be rather powerfully moved to avoid any such
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conflict with him as would justify him in exercising his privilege. 
If his appearance were mandatory, although his weapon against 
management would not be weakened, still in some circumstances 
he might even be an ally of management against an unjustified 
attack by mere malcontents.
Beyond this, however, I believe that personal contact by the 
auditor with the directors and stockholders would change him in 
their minds from a somewhat mythical to an entirely human 
figure. He could and probably would discuss the company’s 
affairs more intimately at such meetings than in a formal report 
or in a certificate intended for publication. Incidentally, he 
would be in position to make all parties concerned feel better 
about his fee.
It has been said that the employment of auditors by the man­
agement gives management the direct benefit of their technical 
expertness, and that this benefit might be lost if the auditors were 
elected by the stockholders. I believe that the English experi­
ence nullifies this argument. As a matter of fact, in practice it is 
the management which selects the auditor, and he is retained so 
long as nothing develops to destroy the stockholders’ confidence 
in him. But he knows at all times two things—first, that if he 
permits management to manoeuvre him into a betrayal of the 
confidence of stockholders he commits professional suicide; and, 
second, that in any dispute with management he has the right to 
appeal to the stockholders, so that management will not too long 
maintain against him a position which it would find untenable at 
a meeting of the stockholders. The result is that management 
and auditor will compose their differences for the best interest of 
ownership, and the full value of the auditor’s knowledge and skill 
remains available for management in all its proper activities.
I can not leave the question of the best method of selection of 
auditors with a discussion only of who should do the selecting. 
After that question has been settled, as I think it must and will 
ultimately be settled, in favor of election by the stockholders, 
these parties are left in possession of a powerful instrument for 
their own good but, if I may say so, with scant knowledge of how 
to use it. What, then, is the best basis for selecting an auditor 
from among those whose services are available?
From the very nature of the relationship, the auditor who bla­
tantly offers himself, whether with eye-catching insertions in the 
public prints, with self-laudatory circulars, or with direct personal-
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call solicitation, should be eliminated—and these comments apply, 
of course, to the large organization as well as to the small firm or 
individual practitioner. I deplore, and so I believe do many of 
my friends who are partners in firms organized on a national or 
international basis, the widespread belief that mere bigness stand­
ing alone is evidence of special ability. The only matter of im­
portance with regard to the size of the organization is that the 
size of the organization is a matter of no importance, provided it 
has the facilities necessary to the performance of the work con­
templated. It has been well said that every organization is the 
elongated shadow of one man, and it is the character of that man 
rather than the length of the shadow which determines the 
character of the organization.
The auditor elected by the stockholders should be known by 
them to be thoroughly skilled in accounting, impregnably in­
dependent and more than ordinarily courageous. These are 
named in the order of the probable demand for them; otherwise 
their importance is in the reverse order. Similarly on the sea, a 
knowledge of navigation is used on every voyage, and is of course 
always indispensable; but when the ship is damaged or when 
storms arise there must be found also the utmost of resourceful­
ness and courage. The time to make sure that these qualities 
are present is before the vessel sails.
Stockholders should not delude themselves into thinking that 
the enactment of a statute requiring an audit by an auditor re­
sponsible directly to them will of itself give complete protection to 
their investments. There are some things which a man must do 
for himself, which none other can do for him; and eternal vigilance 
is the price of financial safety no less than of political liberty.
There has been much discussion during the past few years as to 
the form which auditors’ certificates should take. The question 
seems to me very simple if viewed properly, and I believe much of 
the discussion has been aimed really at the collateral question of 
how much responsibility the certificate imposes on the auditor. 
I submit that very little improvement can be made on the require­
ments of the English statute in this respect.
Two features can, I think, be changed to advantage. In 
England by statute, and in this country to a considerable extent 
by custom, the balance-sheet to be submitted to stockholders is 
prepared by the company’s own accounting staff, and the auditor 
certifies his opinion as to its correctness. I submit that regard­
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less of how the company may keep its accounts or prepare its 
balance-sheet, it should be the privilege and the duty of the 
auditor to prepare independently, and in such manner as to him 
seems proper, the statements which are to go to the stockholders 
over his name. To the question: “Whose balance-sheet is it?” 
I would answer, “ It is the stockholders’ balance-sheet, and should 
be prepared for their information by their own independent ac­
countants possessed of all information necessary to that end.” 
The second change is that the balance-sheet should be required to 
be accompanied by reasonably detailed statements of the income 
and surplus accounts—where we are is important, but how we got 
there is no less so.
Paraphrasing the English act, then, I submit that the statute 
should contain a provision requiring the auditors to state
(a) whether or not they have obtained all the information and 
explanations they have required;
(b) that the accompanying financial statements have been pre­
pared by them and in their opinion, when taken collec­
tively, exhibit a correct view of the company’s financial 
condition at a named date and of the changes therein for 
a named period; and
(c) whether or not such statements are in agreement with the 
company’s books,
together with adequate explanations in the event either (a) or (c) 
is stated in the negative. There can be no question, as I see it, as 
to the desirability of a statutory requirement that the auditor’s 
certificate be brief, succinct and unequivocal.
Compulsory audit of corporations is being urged because losses 
have been sustained by investors who have been uninformed with 
regard to the manner in which their funds have been handled. 
Change “uninformed” to “misinformed” and the reason appears 
for the demand that corporation auditors be selected by the stock­
holders and thereby freed from the domination of management. 
Weasel words providing an escape from responsibility for state­
ments technically correct but actually misleading have led to the 
insistence that the responsibility of the auditor be fixed by re­
quiring him to make his certificate a definite and unequivocal 
statement with regard to the results of his work.
These reforms will come. They will lead to better conditions. 
Let us work to prevent them from arousing false hopes and pre­
cipitating further disappointments. After they shall have been 
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accomplished in the best form obtainable, there still will rest on 
our profession the burden of a very great responsibility. The 
meeting of that responsibility is worthy of our best efforts; it will 
be accomplished by an unswerving devotion to the ideal of hewing 
to the line, letting the chips fall where they may.
I have taken much of your time. Alexander Pope said it all in 
two lines:
“For forms of government let fools contest: 
Whate’er is best administered is best.”
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